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The More, the Marry-er? The Future of Polygamous Marriage in the Wake of Obergefell v. 
Hodges 




 Since this nation’s inception, the United States Supreme Court has grappled with 
conceptualizing marriage in a way that reflects both this nation’s values and this nation’s 
Constitution.  Conceptualizing marriage in a concordant way has proven to be a time-intensive 
task, leading the Supreme Court to analyze a variety of factual scenarios to determine which 
relationships fall within the protective confines of the Constitution.  Over time, the Supreme 
Court’s perception of marriage has adapted to changing societal norms, dealing with issues such 
as race,1 poverty,2 and criminality.3  The limits of such adaptation were tested in recent years, 
when courts were faced with the constitutionality of same-sex marriage.  
 The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of same-sex marriage and the related 
fundamental right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges.4   In Obergefell, a class of homosexual 
plaintiffs claimed that their constitutional rights were violated when they were denied the right to 
marry their same-sex partner.5  Ultimately, on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in the 
plaintiffs’ favor and held that a fundamental right to marry protects marriages between same-sex 
couples.6  
 In the wake of Obergefell, one of the main criticisms of the majority opinion is that it will 
reduce governmental restriction of marriage, opening the floodgates to marriages of all sorts.  For 
                                                        
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2013, Drew University.  I 
would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Solangel Maldonado, for her guidance and support in the 
writing of this Comment.  
1 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
2 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
3 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
4 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
5 Id. at 2593.  
6 Id. at 2607.  
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example, some have questioned whether the fundamental right to marry recognized by Obergefell 
also includes the right to marry multiple people. 7  Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell 
questions the viability of a definition of marriage that is limited to those unions between two 
people.  In his view, the majority calls this definition and its limit into question.8  He also suggests 
that an extension of the fundamental right to marry to polygamous marriages may be even more 
natural than an extension of the right to same-sex marriages, since polygamous marriages are more 
deeply steeped in some global cultural traditions.9   
 Similarly, a New York Times op-ed piece by William Baude, published soon after the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Obergefell, questioned the validity and power given 
to “the number two” in the legal definition of marriage.10  Like Chief Justice Roberts, Baude 
argued that the jump from same-sex marriage to plural marriage is not a large one, especially since 
the majority’s opinion focused primarily on a “fundamental right to marry,” rather than the narrow 
issue of sexual orientation.11  Baude explains that the “fundamental right to marry” is more loosely 
defined, and is characterized by concepts such as autonomy, personal fulfillment, child rearing, 
and social order.12  This broad judicial conceptualization of marriage may therefore include and 
                                                        
7 There are three types of plural marriage, or what is more colloquially referred to as “polygamy”: (1) polygyny, the 
most common type, in which one man is married to two or more wives; (2) polyandry, in which one woman is 
married to two or more husbands; and (3) polygynandry, a group marriage in which two or more wives are 
simultaneously married to two or more husbands.  Alean Al-Krenawi & Vered Slonim-Nevo, Psychosocial and 
Familial Functioning of Children from Polygynous and Monogamous Families, 148 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 745, 745 
(2008).  In accordance with both statistics and relevant literature, this Comment will use the term “polygamy” 
interchangeably with “polygyny.”  See Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 
1588, para. 136 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (“Over the course of human history, polygyny has been the only form of polygamy 
practiced on a significant basis.  Polyandry has been exceedingly rare and has tended to be a temporary adaption to 
environmental stresses or other ecological factors.”). 
8 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“One immediate question invited by the majority’s position 
is whether the States may retain the definition of marriage as a union of two people.  Although the majority 
randomly inserts the adjective ‘two’ in various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the 
core definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-woman elements may not.”) (internal citations omitted).   
9 Id.  
10 William Baude, Is Polygamy Next?, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/opinion/is-
polygamy-next.html?_r=0.  
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
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protect “groups of adults who have profound polyamorous attachments and wish to build families 
and join the community.”13 
 This Comment will examine the fundamental right to marry and analyze whether 
Obergefell compels the United States Supreme Court to recognize plural marriages.  Part II of this 
Comment will briefly summarize the Supreme Court’s rulings on the fundamental right to marry 
and the closely associated right to privacy.  This Part highlights the Court’s different (and at times, 
disparate) approaches in cases dealing with a fundamental right to marry.  Part III will then discuss 
the fundamental right to marry in the wake of Obergefell.  Here, the main question is whether the 
Court would recognize the right to marry multiple people as a fundamental right.  Because it is not 
clear what standard or test(s) the Court would apply, Part III will discuss and analyze three possible 
approaches.  Part III will ultimately argue that the fundamentality of the right to marry multiple 
people will probably depend on the mode of the Court’s analysis.  Part IV argues that even if the 
Court were to find that the fundamental right to marry includes a right to plural marriage, laws 
prohibiting polygamous marriage could withstand constitutional scrutiny because such marriages 
pose a significant risk to the welfare of women and children.  Finally, Part V will conclude that, in 
the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, a future ruling as to the 
constitutionality of polygamous marriage will largely depend on the standard of scrutiny the Court 
applies.  
II. The Foundational Cases 
 
A. The History of the Fundamental Right to Marry 
 
 As early as 1888, the Supreme Court recognized that marriage “creat[es] the most 
important relation in life.” 14  Underscoring this sentiment, marriage has been epitomized as “the 
                                                        
13 Id.  
14 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (emphasis added).   
 4 
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor 
progress.”15  Thus, the fundamentality of marriage was recognized, separate from Due Process 
Clause issues.16  Over the next seventy-nine years, the Court came to recognize the right to marry 
as a fundamental part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,17 but marriage was not 
considered a separate “fundamental right.”  
 In 1967, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental “freedom to marry.”18  In Loving v. 
Virginia, a couple alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated when they were indicted 
on charges of violating the state’s ban on interracial marriage. 19   The Court reversed the 
indictment, applied strict scrutiny,20 recognized a fundamental right to marry, and held that the 
fundamental right to marry included the right to marry a person of a different race.21   
                                                        
15 Id. at 211.  See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental 
to the very existence and survival of the race”).  
16 This Comment will look at polygamous marriage through the lens of substantive due process.  There are two types 
of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims: procedural and substantive.  Procedural due process claims ensure 
that proper court procedures are followed before an individual’s right to life, liberty, or property is taken away.  
Aaron J. Shuler, Short Essay, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We Want to Be with 
the "Equalerty" of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 220, 223 (2010).  
Comparatively, substantive due process is a doctrine that has evolved to protect rights not explicitly enumerated in 
the constitution.  Id.  Substantive due process is commonly accepted to encompass fundamental, or something akin 
to fundamental, rights.  Id.   
17 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  
18 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  
19 Id. at 2–3. 
20 Strict scrutiny is a standard of review courts use when reviewing cases.  Specifically, strict scrutiny is used to 
determine whether restrictions of a fundamental right are constitutional.  “When a statutory classification 
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right,” strict scrutiny says “it cannot be upheld unless it is 
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”  Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).  However, strict scrutiny is not the only judicial standard of review available.  
Traditionally, if a right is not deemed “fundamental,” the court may apply a more deferential standard of review 
known as “rational basis review.”  Rational basis review requires that “an impartial lawmaker could logically 
believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of 
the disadvantaged class.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).  Since rational basis review is more deferential toward lawmakers, and since it doesn’t require that the 
law at issue be the only means possible of achieving the goal, this is a much easier standard to meet.  
21 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and 
survival.  To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in 
these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.  
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a person of another race resides with the individual 
and cannot be infringed by the state.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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 Over time, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental right to marry protected couples 
from different economic backgrounds, thereby reaffirming the fundamental right to marry. For 
example, in Zablocki v. Redhail,22 a group of Wisconsin residents challenged the constitutionality 
of a Wisconsin statute that prohibited parents behind on child support from legally marrying.23  
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held for the plaintiffs, reaffirming that there is a fundamental 
right to marry, and extending the holding in Loving to the facts in Zablocki.24  Here, the Court 
suggested that it would be antithetical to recognize a right to privacy, while permitting such 
restrictions on the right to marry.25  Notably, however, the Court stated that recognition of a 
fundamental right to marry does not mean that there cannot be any state regulation of marriage.  
Instead, the Court clarified that the State may regulate decisions and acts associated with marriage, 
so long as these regulations “do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship.”26  
 The fundamental right to marry was further strengthened and institutionalized by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Turner v. Safley.27  In this case, the Court considered whether the 
constitutionally protected right to marry applies to prison inmates.  The Court held that it does, but 
it applied a lower standard of review.28  Rather than strict scrutiny, which requires narrow tailoring, 
the Court in Turner held that the regulation needed only to be “reasonably related to legitimate 
                                                        
22 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
23 The statute would not allow parents with child support obligations to obtain a marriage license until they 
submitted proof of compliance with the obligations, and demonstrated that the children “are not then and are not 
likely thereafter to become public charges.”  WIS. STAT. §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973) (repealed 1977).  
24 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (“Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent 
decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”).  
25 Id. at 386 (“It would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life 
and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”). 
26 Id.  
27 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
28 Id. at 89.  
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penological interests.”29  Thus, unlike the strict scrutiny standard applied in Loving and Zablocki, 
the Court in Turner applied the more deferential rational basis review, since this case dealt with 
prison inmates.30  Despite the different standard of review, this case is yet another example of the 
Court’s extension of the fundamental right to marry.  
B. The Fundamental Right to Marry Someone of the Same Sex 
 While the United States Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to marry, this did 
not mean that all individuals could exercise this right, free from government restriction.  Notably, 
same-sex couples remained outside the right’s protective confines.  However, this did not mean 
that the arena of same-sex constitutional issues was without judicial reform.  Years after the 
fundamental right to marry was extended to heterosexual interracial couples, debtor parents, and 
incarcerated persons, a related right was recognized and extended to homosexual couples in 
Lawrence v. Texas.31   
 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court was confronted with a challenge to the Texas Penal Code, 
Section 21.06(a), which criminalized sodomy between two individuals of the same sex.  Without 
identifying their specific standard of review, 32 the Court ultimately held that such an “intrusion 
into the personal and private life of the individual” was constitutionally unjustifiable.33 In doing 
so, this case extended Due Process Clause protection to same-sex relationships in an 
unprecedented way.34 
                                                        
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
32 Though the Court did not announce a particular standard of review, it did use language that suggested it was 
applying rational basis review.  See id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can 
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”) (emphasis added).  
33 Id. at 578. 
34 Id. at 567 (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”).  
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 In 2013, a decade after Lawrence, United States v. Windsor 35  challenged the 
constitutionality of section three of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which denied federal 
recognition to same-sex marriages validly performed under state law.36  In its opinion, the Supreme 
Court did not specify a particular standard of review37 or explicitly mention “substantive due 
process.”38  Nevertheless, the Court held that section three of DOMA was unconstitutional.  In so 
holding, the Court left section two of DOMA untouched, “allow[ing] states to refuse to recognize 
same-sex marriage performed under the laws of other states.”39  Thus, Windsor did not result in 
blanket acceptance of same-sex marriage.40    
 Two years later, in Obergefell, the Court finally extended the fundamental right to marry 
to homosexual couples.41  In Obergefell, as in Lawrence and Windsor, the Court did not expressly 
                                                        
35 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).   
36 The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.S. §7 (1996).  
37 Though the court did not specify which standard of review it was applying, some of the majority opinion’s 
language was reminiscent of rational basis review.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for 
no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its 
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”) (emphasis added).  However, the Court’s opinion 
seemed to hold the Defense of Marriage Act to a higher standard than rational basis.  See id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“As nearly as I can tell, the Court . . . [in] its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central 
propositions are taken from rational-basis cases . . . .  [T]he Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles 
that deferential framework.”).  See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 
2014) (“In its words and its deed, Windsor established a level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual 
orientation that is unquestionably higher than rational basis review.  In other words, Windsor requires that 
heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving sexual orientation”); Robert C. Farrell, Justice 
Kennedy's Idiosyncratic Understanding of Equal Protection and Due Process, and Its Costs, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
439, 481–84 (2014); Jack Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 130 (2015) (“Justice 
Kennedy's language and analysis combined with the ultimate determination of the Court that Section 3 of DOMA 
was unconstitutional, indicates that some elevated level of scrutiny was employed.”); Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, 
Note, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2070, 2116 (2015) 
(“The Court did not explicitly state what level of scrutiny it applied in reviewing [the Defense of Marriage Act].  
However, the Court's "opinion did not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions were taken from rational-
basis cases such as Moreno and Romer.  Therefore, Windsor fits within the tradition of rational basis with bite.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
38 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The majority never utters the dreaded words ‘substantive 
due process,’ perhaps sensing the disrepute into which the doctrine has fallen.”).  
39 Id. at 2682–83. 
40 Id. at 2697 (Roberts, J., dissenting).  
41 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the 
liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”) (emphasis added). 
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state the standard of review it applied.  In fact, the Court seemed to ignore the preexisting analytical 
framework that had been established for substantive due process claims.42  Instead, the Court 
identified four “principles and traditions” that demonstrated why marriage is a fundamental, 
constitutional right.43  After analyzing these four “principles and traditions,” the Court found that 
they applied equally to heterosexual and homosexual unions.44  Resultantly, the Court extended 
the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples.45  
C. Why Do These Cases Matter? 
 There are several lessons to be learned from the preceding review of Supreme Court 
precedent.  First, there is a fundamental right to marry that has been upheld and protected by the 
Supreme Court since 1967.46  Additionally, the Court has viewed the fundamental right to marry 
as an ever-changing right.47  However, despite expansion of the fundamental right to marry, that 
right has only been extended to couples.48  
 Furthermore, the preceding review shows that the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
fundamental right to marry has been both extensive and complex.  The Court has repeatedly upheld 
a fundamental right to marry, and a concurrent, yet separate, fundamental right to privacy.49  These 
                                                        
42 Id. at 2602 (“Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most 
circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices.  Yet while that approach may have 
been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach 
this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.”).  See also id. at 2621 
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting that “the majority’s position requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg”).  
43 Id. at 2589; see also infra Part III.C. 
44 Id. at 2590. 
45 Id. at 2604.  
46 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
47 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (“[C]hanged understandings of marriage are characteristic of a nation 
where new dimensions of freedom became apparent to new generations, often through perspectives that begin in 
pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.”).  
48 See, e.g., id. at 2607 (“same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry in all states”) (emphasis added).   
49 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating, on the topic of marriage: “We deal with a 
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system.  
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
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holdings have been based on a variety of factors and tests.50  At times, the Court has completely 
avoided any language reminiscent of a standard of review, and when a specific method has been 
employed (either implicitly or explicitly), it has ranged from rational basis review51  to strict 
scrutiny.52  Thus, when dealing with the fundamental right to marry, the Court’s methodology 
remains relatively undefined.   
III. The Fundamental Right to Plural Marriage 
 
 As evidenced in Part II, the United States Supreme Court has yet to embrace a uniform 
framework for analyzing the fundamental right to marry.  Because of the variety of methods and 
tests used in previous cases, it is difficult to predict how the Court will analyze the right to plural 
marriage. In most substantive due process cases, the Court uses a two-step inquiry.  The first 
question is whether the right at issue is “fundamental.”  Importantly, a right’s fundamentality (or 
lack thereof) determines the applicable standard of review.  Generally, the Court applies strict 
scrutiny to “fundamental” rights and rational basis review to non-fundamental rights. 53    
 This Part will strive to determine whether the right to plural marriage is “fundamental.”  
Since the Court has not adopted a uniform approach, this Part will view the potential 
fundamentality of plural marriage through three different lenses: the traditional “deeply rooted” 
approach, the flexible approach, and the Obergefell four-part test.  As this Part will show, the 
Court’s methodology will largely dictate how it will address challenges to restrictions on 
polygamous marriage.  
                                                        
prior decisions”).  See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that the fundamental right to privacy 
“has some extension to activities relating to marriage”).  
50 See infra Part II.  
51 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
52 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).   
53 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (noting that “‘due process of law’ . . . forbids the government to 
infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”).  
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 The fundamentality of a right to plural marriage can be outcome determinative since a 
judicially recognized fundamental right is protected by the Constitution and cannot be impinged 
upon by state law.54  Since Loving, the Court has struck down state laws that have infringed upon 
the fundamental right to marry. 55   Most recently, in Obergefell, the Court extended the 
fundamental right to marry to same-sex, monogamous couples.  Significantly, a two-person limit 
is evident at various points throughout Obergefell. 56   Thus, while the Court expanded the 
fundamental right to marry, it did not diverge from the monogamous model it has retained as a 
defining element of this right.   
 By definition, plural marriage does not fall within the traditionally protected, monogamous, 
marital model.  Resultantly, the right to marry multiple people cannot be automatically inferred 
from Obergefell, and would require an individualized inquiry.  Post-Obergefell, the Supreme Court 
could adopt one of three approaches to analyze challenges to restrictions on plural marriage.  
A. Approach 1: The Glucksberg Approach  
 In Washington v. Glucksberg,57 the Supreme Court enumerated a two-factor approach to 
be used when determining whether a right is fundamental.  First, the right needs to be “objectively, 
                                                        
54 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (“[A]ll fundamental rights comprised within the term 
liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the states.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
55 See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. 78; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.  
56 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“The four principles and traditions to be discussed 
demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same sex 
couples.”) (emphasis added); id. (“The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike 
any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”) (emphasis added); id. (“The nature of marriage is that, 
through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and 
spirituality.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2601 (“[J]ust as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge 
to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 2602 (“The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the 
Fourteenth amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”) 
(emphasis added).  
57 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  The plaintiffs argued that the State’s ban on physician-assisted 
suicide was an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 708.  The Court determined that there 
was not a fundamental right at issue, and applied rational basis review.  Id. at 728.  After applying rational basis 
review, the Court held that the ban on physician-assisted suicide was rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest, and was therefore constitutional.  Id.   
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deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”58  Second, the asserted right must be described 
narrowly, so as to include only the specific interests at stake.59  For example, in Glucksberg, the 
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ loosely-defined “liberty to shape death,” 60  replacing it with a 
narrower “right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”61  By 
defining the contested right narrowly, the Court placed it outside the protective confines of the 
Constitution.  Thus, judicial framing can determine whether or not a contested right is 
“fundamental.”      
 Post-Obergefell, the Court may adopt the Glucksberg approach to decide if restrictions on 
polygamous marriage are constitutional.  First, since the Glucksberg approach requires narrow 
tailoring of the issue, it is likely that the Court would view restrictions on polygamous marriage in 
light of “the right to marry multiple people.”  The limited “right to marry multiple people” can be 
distinguished from the broader, deeply rooted, fundamental “right to marry.”  As in Glucksberg, 
this narrow categorization could prove fatal.  
 In step two, the Court would ask if the right to marry multiple people is “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition.”62  Polygamy has been prohibited throughout Western societies 
for more than 1750 years. 63   In America, polygamy has always been viewed as an “offence against 
                                                        
58 Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (stating that fundamental rights and 
liberties that are afforded constitutional protection are those that are, from an objective perspective, “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition”).  But cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2602 (“Glucksberg did insist that liberty under 
the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical 
practices.  Yet while that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-
assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, 
including marriage and intimacy.”).  Because of this apparent incongruity, and Obergefell’s explicit repudiation of 
the Glucksberg framework, it is unlikely that the Court would ask whether or not the right to plural marriage is 
deeply rooted.  However, since this possibility is seemingly, but not completely or explicitly, banned in the case of 
polygamous marriage, this Comment will walk through the legal analysis that would ordinarily be required.  
59 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21.  
60 Id. at 722.  
61 Id. at 723.  
62 Id.  
63 See, e.g., Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 229 (Can. B.C. 
S.C.) (“[F]or more than 1750 years the Western legal tradition has . . . declared polygamy to be an offence.  The 
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society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity.”64  In fact, when 
states first joined the Union, they prohibited polygamy either by their own statute, derived from 
English common law, or by virtue of territorial prohibitions. 65   Although members of some 
religions had customarily engaged in plural marriages prior to the Nation’s founding, neither 
states66 nor individuals67 were granted immunity from the prohibition of polygamous marriage.  
Today, polygamous marriage remains a criminal offense, prohibited by penal statutes across the 
country.68  Thus, under the Glucksberg approach, the Supreme Court would probably deny that 
polygamy is deeply rooted, and would therefore likely hold that there is not a fundamental right to 
polygamous marriage.  
B. Approach 2: The Flexible Approach  
 Part II demonstrates that the United States Supreme Court has recognized an ever-evolving 
fundamental right to marry.69  Allowing for the evolution of this right, the Court has adopted a 
relatively flexible analysis.70  For example, instead of carving out personalized rights for non-
traditional couples (e.g. a right to marry someone of a different race, or a right to marry someone 
                                                        
denunciation of the practice has been based on natural, philosophical, political, sociological, psychological and 
scientific arguments.”).  See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (“At common law, the second 
marriage was always void (2 Kent. Com. 79), and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as 
an ofence [sic.] against society.”).    
64 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.  
65 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1197 (D. Utah 2013).   
66 Utah was required to ban polygamous marriage in order to be accepted into the union.  See Casey E. Faucon, 
Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in America, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2014) (“The Utah 
Constitution of 1896 permanently banned the practice [of polygamy], allowing Utah to attain statehood in 1896.”). 
See also UTAH CONST. art. XXIV, § 2.  
67 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165 (“[A]s a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the 
United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed.”).  
68 See, e.g., NY PENAL LAW § 255.15 (Consol. 2016) (“A person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports 
to contract a marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living 
spouse.  Bigamy is a class E felony.”).  See also State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 741–45 (Utah 2006). 
69 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the 
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
70 For example, the right to interracial marriage (Loving) and the right to marry someone of the same sex 
(Obergefell). 
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of the same sex), the Court adopted a more broad-based approach, including many non-traditional 
couples under the broader umbrella of the fundamental right to marry.71  
 The main difference between the second approach and the first approach is the way in 
which the right is defined.  Under Approach 1, the Glucksberg approach, the right at issue is 
narrowly defined.72  Under Approach 2, the flexible approach, the right at issue is broadly defined.  
The breadth of the second approach allows more couples to be protected by the fundamental right 
to marry. 
 Members of the Court have struggled with these two approaches and have expressed 
different preferences.73  Thus far, no approach has triumphed.  Since members of the Court have 
adopted both approaches,74 it is difficult to predict which approach would be favored in future 
cases.  Furthermore, the differences in these two approaches could yield two different views on 
the constitutionality of the prohibition of polygamous marriage.  
 The United States Supreme Court seems to have adopted the second approach, or 
something akin to it, in many landmark cases dealing with the fundamental right to marry.75  Under 
                                                        
71 This can be compared to the Court’s approach in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In Lawrence, the 
Court analyzed the Texas statute under the broad umbrella of “liberty,” instead of a more myopic right, the right to 
engage in homosexual sodomy.  
72 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705 (1997) (“a right to commit suicide which itself includes a 
right to assistance in doing so”).  
73 Some justices have embraced the first approach, narrowly defining the right at issue.  See e.g., Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (stating that the court “refer[s] to the most specific level at which a relevant 
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”) (emphasis added).  However, 
there is not a uniform approach, either between or within cases.  See e.g., id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(disagreeing with the majority and citing cases, including Loving and Turner, to point out that ”[o]n occasion the 
Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be ‘the 
most specific level’ available”) (emphasis added).  See also Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(“Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 
respect for the teachings of history and solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.”) (citations 
omitted).  But see id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting) (“What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is 
arguable.”).  
74 Compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705 (“[A] right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in 
doing so.”), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and 
more transcendent dimensions.”).  
75 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage’; Turner did not ask 
about a ‘right of inmates to marry’; and Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of father with unpaid child support duties 
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this approach, the Court has viewed the borders of the fundamental right to marry as relatively 
malleable.  Resultantly, the Court has extended the protections associated with the fundamental 
right to marry to interracial couples,76 inmates,77 and parents who have not paid child support.78    
 It is feasible that the Court could use this second approach if asked to analyze the 
constitutionality of restrictions on plural marriage.  Use of this approach would likely entail 
analysis under the broader umbrella of the fundamental right to marry.  Resultantly, this would 
eliminate the need for separate analysis of a “right to marry multiple people.”  Since the 
fundamental right to marry is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” the Court 
would likely conclude that the fundamental right to marry encompasses a right to plural marriage.  
C. Approach 3: The Obergefell Four-Part Test 
 In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court adopted a third approach, a four-part test.  
Using this approach, the Court compared same-sex marriage to marriage more generally, and 
considered whether the “principles and traditions [that] demonstrate the reasons marriage is 
fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force”79 to those in same-sex marriages.  
Ultimately, the Court held that each of the four principles and traditions applied equally.80   
 Under this approach, the Court may try to envelop polygamous marriage in the cloak of 
the fundamental right to marry.  This would require considering whether the “principles and 
traditions [that] demonstrate the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with 
equal force”81 to those in polygamous marriages.  The four “principles and traditions” enumerated 
                                                        
to marry.’  Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a 
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”).  
76 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
77 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
78 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).  
79 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.  
80 Id. at 2589.  
81 Id.   
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in Obergefell were: (1) “individual autonomy,”82 (2) the importance of the “two-person union,”83 
(3) the rights of “childrearing, procreation, and education,”84 and (4) “social order.”85   
 First, the Court would need to determine whether the right to marry multiple individuals is 
characteristic of ordered liberty.  In Obergefell, the Court found that a person's choice to enter into 
a marital union is “inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”86  An individual’s decisions 
regarding marriage have profound implications, affecting many aspects of one’s freedom. 87  
Resultantly, this factor focuses on the general decision to marry, without specifying whether, and 
to whom, one should marry.88  As a result, the Court held that the implications of the decision to 
marry were unaffected by sexual orientation.89  As with monogamous marriage, the choice to enter 
into a polygamous marriage can also “shape an individual’s destiny.”90  Thus, it is conceivable 
that the Court could find that this factor also applies to polygamous marriages.  
 Second, the Court found “that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”91  Applying this 
finding to same-sex marriages, the Court concluded that same-sex marriage supports an equally 
significant two-person union.  The Court held that protection given to the intimate relationship 
between married individuals does not vary based on the sexual orientation of the couple.92  In 
Obergefell, the Court’s analysis of this factor seems to turn on the intimate relationship between 
                                                        
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 2590.  
85 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590.  
86 Id. at 2599.  
87 For example, expression, intimacy, and sexuality. Id.  
88 Id.  See also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (“the decision whether and to 
whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition”).    
89 Obergefell. 135 S. Ct. at 2589 (“Decisions about marriage are the most intimate that an individual can make.  This 
is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.”) (citations omitted).  
90 Id. at 2599.  
91 Id. at 2599.  
92 Id. at 2600.  
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married individuals and the constitutional protections afforded to that relationship.93  Superficially, 
this analysis seems like it would apply equally to those in polygamous marriages.  However, the 
Court specifically quantified the union as being between two individuals.94  Based on its analysis 
in Obergefell, the Court may take one of two routes if it decides to use this approach in future 
cases: (1) it may decide to focus on the “union” aspect of this factor, and the importance of 
protecting the intimate relationship between married individuals;95 or (2) the Court may choose to 
preserve the “two-person” limit spelled out in Obergefell.  If the Court takes the second approach, 
polygamous marriage would be seen as conflicting with the traditional, constitutionally protected 
right to marry.  
 Third, the Court said same-sex marriage should be protected because it “safeguards 
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education.”96  This factor is the most challenging for plural marriage advocates to overcome.  
Many studies have suggested the danger polygamous marriage poses to women and children.97  
For this reason, it is likely that the Court would view polygamous marriage as distinguishable from 
monogamous marriages.  
Lastly, the Court emphasized that marriage is important to our Nation because it is “the 
keystone of our social order.”98  Like same-sex marriage, polygamous marriage is not deeply 
rooted in our nation’s legal tradition.  However, in Obergefell, the court focused on the traditional, 
                                                        
93 Id.   
94 Id. at 2599 (“two-person union unlike any other”) (emphasis added).     
95 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to 
find no one there.  It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while both still live 
there will be someone to care for the other.”).  
96 Id.   
97 See infra Part IV.  Note that, though there is a large body of evidence suggesting that polygamous marriage can 
and does significantly harm women and children, the evidence is not conclusive.   
98 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.  
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generalized, importance of “marriage,” rather than “same-sex marriage” specifically.99  Here, the 
Court observed that marriage is a key part of many legal and social rights.100  By denying same-
sex couples the right to marry, states were also barring them from accessing these legal and social 
rights.101  Similarly, those in plural marriages are denied access to many legal and social rights that 
are reserved to married couples.  For this reason, polygamous marriage is akin to same-sex 
marriage, pre-Obergefell.  Since the Obergefell Court recognized the importance of making such 
rights available to all married individuals, this factor would probably weigh in favor of protecting 
those in plural marriages.   
In sum, factors one and four seem to favor protecting individuals in plural marriages.  
However, factors two and three present some hurdles for plural marriage advocates.  Given the 
novelty of this test, future use and analysis of these factors has yet to be determined.  Resultantly, 
an analysis using these factors could either favor or disfavor plural marriage.   
D.   Is There a Fundamental Right to Plural Marriage? 
 In the wake of Obergefell, it is unclear whether the Court would recognize a fundamental 
right to a plural marriage.  If faced with the constitutionality of restrictions on plural marriage, 
there are three main approaches the Court may take.  If the Court uses the “deeply rooted” approach 
it would probably hold against protecting those in plural marriages.  However, if the Court adopts 
the flexible approach, plural marriages may be protected as a subpart of the more general 
fundamental right to marry.  The Court’s analysis of polygamous marriage under the Obergefell 
four-part test is less clear.  Unlike the Glucksberg approach or the flexible approach, this third 
approach could weigh for or against legal recognition of polygamous marriages.  
                                                        
99 Id. (“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle.”). 
100 Id. at 2601. 
101 Id.  
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 As analysis of these three approaches shows, the United States Supreme Court could 
recognize a fundamental right to plural marriage.  If it did so, it would likely be under the guise of 
the more general, fundamental right to marry.102  However, this would not be the end of the 
conversation—the Court would then need to look at the means and ends of the legislation at issue, 
as well as any alternative options.   
IV. Even If the Right to Plural Marriage is Fundamental, Can it Survive Judicial Review? 
 
  There are two steps to determining whether or not a particular piece of legislation is 
constitutional under a substantive due process analysis.  First, the Court must determine whether 
or not there is a fundamental right at issue.  Part III demonstrated that plural marriage may or may 
not be viewed a fundamental right.  Since it is possible that the Court may view plural marriage as 
a fundamental right, 103  Part IV will examine the second question—whether anti-polygamy 
legislation can survive judicial review.  
 Traditionally, the applicable level of scrutiny depends on whether the right is 
“fundamental.”  Generally, strict scrutiny has been applied to cases where a fundamental right has 
been identified.104  Under “strict scrutiny,” the government action must be narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling state interest.105  Thus, strict scrutiny requires a two-part analysis: (1) 
whether the state has a compelling interest in limiting the fundamental right, and (2) whether the 
state action is narrowly tailored to furthering that compelling interest.  
                                                        
102 In Obergefell, the Court clearly said that it was going to look at marriage in general, instead of as an 
amalgamation of separate rights.  Id. at 2602.   
103 As Part III shows, the Court may view plural marriage as either “the right to marry multiple people,” or as part of 
the broader-based “right to marry.”  See infra Part III.   
104 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
105 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (“When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely 
tailored to effectuate only those interests.”).  See supra note 20.  
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 The State has a compelling interest in prohibiting plural marriage because of the danger it 
poses to women and children.106  Some studies have shown polygamous marriage to harm women 
and children both in terms of their physical wellbeing (e.g. by abuse and increased health risks107), 
and in terms of their emotional wellbeing.108  The fact that plural marriage poses this danger to 
women and children differentiates it from same-sex marriage.109  Though there are studies to the 
contrary,110 the potential for such substantial harm may allow the State to lawfully restrict plural 
marriage.111   
A. Harm to Women 
 Women are harmed by polygamous marriage, and the State has a compelling interest in 
prohibiting this harm.  Most prominently, polygamy violates norms of gender equality 112 since it 
                                                        
106 See Richard A. Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate 
Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 225, 233 (2001) (“The courts have an interest in protecting women and children from the strikingly real 
crimes committed in polygamous communities.”).  
107 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 8 (Can. B.C. S.C.) 
(noting that women in polygamous marriages “are more likely to die in childbirth and live shorter lives than their 
monogamous counterparts”).  
108 See Salman Elbedour et al., The Effect of Polygamous Marital Structure of Behavioral, Emotional, and Academic 
Adjustment in Children: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, 5 CLINICAL CHILD AND FAMILY PSYCHOL. REV. 
255, 259 (2002) (“[T]he stress of polygamous family life predisposes mothers and children to psychological 
problems.”).  
109 Nicholas Bala, Why Canada’s Prohibition of Polygamy is Constitutionally Valid and Sound Social Policy, 25 
CAN. J. FAM. L. 165, 169 (2009) (“Unlike the recognition of same-sex marriage, which promoted equality, protected 
the interests of children and saved government resources, the recognition of polygamy would promote inequality, 
impose costs on society, and harm children.”).  See also id. at 177 (polygamy “raises very different social and 
constitutional issues from the recognition of same-sex marriage”).  
110 But see Angela Campbell, Bountiful Voices, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 183 (2009) (drawing on interviews with 
women in a Canadian polygamous community, Campbell presents a counter-narrative, arguing that polygamy is not 
always as harmful as it is made out to be); Emily Duncan, Note, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love 
is a Many Splendored Thing,” 15 DUKE J. GEND. L. & POL’Y 315, 332 (2008) (arguing that “legalizing polygamy 
would positively effect polygynist women and children” and that “[c]ondemning every practicing polygynist to 
prevent the abuses of some may be counterintuitive”).  
111 See State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 744 (Utah 2006) (“[M]artial relationships serve as the building blocks of our 
society.  The State must be able to assert some level of control over those relationships to ensure the smooth 
operation of laws and further the proliferation of social unions our society deems beneficial while discouraging 
those deemed harmful.”).  
112 See Bala, supra note 109, at 182 (“[T]he social reality today is that polygyny is the only form of polygamy that is 
widely practiced, and many of the concerns about polygyny are based on the inherent inequality in a relationship 
where one man has two or more wives.  The recognition of the importance of monogamy and gender equality, 
combined with the negative psychological and physical health effects on women and children, help explain why 
there is a growing international trend to prohibit or restrict polygamy.”).  See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 
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is a “deeply patriarchal institution.”113  Though, in theory, plural marriage can be between a woman 
and multiple men, in the overwhelming majority of cases plural marriage takes the form of one 
man marrying multiple women (i.e. polygyny).114  
 In many polygamous communities, wives’ roles are determined by theology and the 
structure of their families.115  Because of their position within the family, “[w]omen in polygamous 
marriages are in an inherently vulnerable and unequal position in social and economic terms, and 
are more likely to be victims of domestic violence.”116  There are many reports of husbands 
abusing their wives, and of wives abusing one another.117   At times, the animosity between 
cowives is palpable, even to external family members.118   
 Women in polygamous marriages may also witness the abuse of their cowives. 119  
Oftentimes, cowives will not intervene to stop such violence. 120   Additionally, some wives 
perpetuate violence themselves. 121   One of the most prominent and disturbing examples of 
                                                        
U.S. 145, 166 (1879) (“[P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle . . . which, when applied to large communities, 
fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.”).  
113 Bala, supra note 109, at 168.  See also Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] 
B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 13 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (stating that the patriarchal nature of “[p]olygamy also institutionalized 
gender inequality”).  
114 Al-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo, supra note 7, at 745.  
115 Bala, supra note 109, at 192 (quoting COMMITTEE ON POLYGAMOUS ISSUES, LIFE IN BOUNTIFUL: A REPORT IN 
THE LIFESTYLE OF A POLYGAMOUS COMMUNITY 12 (Apr. 1993)).  
116 Id. at 194.  
117 Id. (“Although some plural wives report harmonious, ‘sisterly’ relationships, competition between wives (and 
sometimes their children) is an unfortunate reality in many polygamous families, and it is not uncommon for a 
dominant wife to physically abuse other wives.”).  
118  The Canadian Case, Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, cited the testimony of a child of 
a polygamous marriage, who noted that her relationship with her father’s other wives was “[v]ery strange . . . with 
the two women who’d married him before my mother, [and her relationship was] much like the relationship [her] 
mother had with them.”  She said, “[m]y mother was my dad’s favourite wife, and being the favourite wife is a 
curse.  You don’t want it.  Because the other women are envious of it and everybody is vying for it, and so you’re 
put down and torn down and ostracized in a lot of ways.  Some women, I’ll hear them talk about this great 
camaraderie they have with their sister wives, and I say not true, because every day of your life is competition for 
his resources, and they are limited and there’s not enough of him to go around.”  Reference re: Section 293 of the 
Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 667 (Can. B.C. S.C.).  
119 Dena Hassouneh-Phillips, Polygamy and Wife Abuse: A Qualitative Study of Muslim Women in America, 22 
HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 735, 744 (2001).  
120 Id.  
121 See id. at 745 (“In cases where emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse was ongoing, cowives sometimes 
became combatants.”).  
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violence in polygamous marriages are the “Shafia family murders,” which occurred in 2009.  In a 
quadruple honor killing, the husband (Mohammad Shafia), his second wife, and his son murdered 
Shafia’s first wife (who was infertile) and his three daughters (believing them to be too 
“Western”).122 
 Women in polygamous marriages are not only more susceptible to physical harm; they are 
also more prone to emotional and psychological harm.123  In a study comparing Bedouin Arab 
women in monogamous marriages to Bedouin Arab women in polygamous marriages, researchers 
Alean Al-Krenawi and John R. Graham found that women in polygamous marriages “showed 
significantly more psychological distress than their counterparts in monogamous marriages.”124  
Specifically, these women were more likely to report higher levels of somatization, obsession-
compulsion, depression, interpersonal sensitivity, hostility, phobia, anxiety, paranoid ideation, 
psychotism, [and] GSI-general symptom severity. 125   The study’s findings also evidenced a 
negative correlation between polygamy and life satisfaction, as well as the quality of women’s 
marital and family lives.126  Though this study was not performed in the United States, and its 
transferability is limited accordingly, it does show the comparative effect of polygamous marriages 
on women.  
B. Harm to Children 
 In addition to women, children are also harmed by polygamous marriage.  Polygamous 
marriages pose several risk factors, the most significant being “family conflict, family distress, the 
                                                        
122 Melinda Dalton, Shafia Jury Finds All Guilty of 1st-degree Murder, CBC NEWS MONTREAL, Jan. 29, 2012, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/shafia-jury-finds-all-guilty-of-1st-degree-murder-1.1150023.  
123 See Bala, supra note 109, at 192–93 (referring to the findings of the Committee on Polygamous Issues, saying 
that “the indoctrinated conformity and lack of personal empowerment for women leads to an underdeveloped sense 
of self, and inability to understand or exercise choice, and a blurring of personal and collective identity”).  
124 Alean Al-Krenawi & John R. Graham, A Comparison of Family Functioning, Life and Marital Satisfactions, and 
Mental Health of Women in Polygamous and Monogamous Marriages, 52 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 5, 10 (2006).  
125 Id.  
126 Id. 
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absence of the father, and financial stress.”127  Combined, these risk factors negatively affect a 
child’s emotional and physical development and wellbeing.  Because plural marriage poses this 
threat, states have a compelling interest in prohibiting plural marriage.   
 1. Familial Conflict and Distress 
 Marital conflict is often a defining characteristic of polygamous marriages.128  Oftentimes 
such conflict manifests itself in physical or emotional abuse. 129  Such abuse has been shown to 
negatively impact a child’s physical, emotional, and social development.130  Even if children are 
not directly harmed in the course of fights between their parents, or between their parents and 
themselves, the fighting can still wreak havoc on their developing bodies and psyches, causing 
permanent damage. 131  
 For example, children in abusive households are more likely to exhibit signs of distress and 
anger, such as running away from their home and being violent with others.132  They are also more 
likely to internalize emotional issues, leading to increased levels of depression and anxiety.133  In 
fact, feelings of depression may be so severe that the child may feel as though there is no way out, 
                                                        
127 Elbedour et al., supra note 108, at 258.  
128 Id. (“Considerable research demonstrates that children of polygamous families experience a higher incidence of 
martial conflict, family violence, and family disruptions then do children of monogamous families.”).  
129 Such physical and emotional abuse is also known as “spousal abuse.”  See JAVAD H. KASHANI & WESLEY D. 
ALLAN, THE IMPACT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 33 (1998) (defining spousal abuse as 
“a behavior pattern, characteristically inflicted on a female by a male, that occurs in physical, emotional, and 
psychological forms”).    
130 See e.g., Abigail H. Gewirtz & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Young Children’s Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence: 
Towards a Developmental Risk and Resilience Framework for Research and Intervention, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 
151, 151 (2003) (“exposure to intimate partner violence can variably affect a child’s development depending on 
other individual and environmental influences”).  
131 See Paul R. Amato & Juliana M. Sobolewski, The Effects of Divorce and Marital Discord on Adult Children’s 
Psychological Well-Being, 66 AM. PSYCHOL. REV. 900 (2001) (“Using 17-year longitudinal data from two 
generations, results show that divorce and marital discord predict lower levels of psychological well-being in 
adulthood.”); Elbedour et al., supra note 108, at 259 (“The psychological literature suggests that marital distress is 
linked with suppressed immune function, cardiovascular arousal, and increases in stress-related hormones.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
132 Kashani & Allan, supra note 129, at 37.  
133 Id. at 37–39. 
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precipitating suicidal and/or homicidal thoughts.134  This cognitive experience has been termed the 
“lockage phenomenon.”135  Significantly, children in abusive homes are also more likely to have 
issues with their social development.136  Marital problems, specifically, have been shown to have 
dramatic, negative effects on childhood development.137  Additionally, researchers have shown 
that in those families where a child’s father abuses his or her mother, the father is also more likely 
to abuse the child him or herself.138   
 Marital conflict also affects a child’s interactions with other family members.  For example, 
conflict between parents may lead to displaced parental aggression; the parents may direct their 
frustration and anger toward their children, who become “scapegoats.”139  Additionally, because 
of the level of conflict in plural marriage households, older siblings may need to step into a 
parenting role for their younger siblings, and also (sometimes) for their parents.140  Thus role 
assumption can cause emotional issues for the older child later on in the child’s life.141  
  Furthermore, polygamous marriages are often marked by periods of intense disruption, 
due to the fluid nature of the marriage.142  The marital unions that comprise a plural marriage 
generally do not occur simultaneously; instead, additional wives and/or husbands are added to the 
marriage over time.  This modification of the marital unit can negatively impact a “developing 
                                                        
134 Id. at 38–39. 
135 See id. (The “‘lockage phenomenon’… proposes that in conflicted or abusive families, an adolescent may be 
under such intense and relentless pressure, either from abuse or witnessing of abuse, that he or she can only see two 
possible means of escape: suicide or homicide”).    
136 Id. at 39–40. 
137 See Elbedour et al., supra note 108, at 258–59 (“Development outcomes of children predicted by marital 
problems include the following: poor social competence, a poorly developed sense of security, poor school 
achievement, misconduct and aggression, and elevated heart rate reactivity.  Marital conflict is also likely to disrupt 
effective parenting and parental involvement.  Further, children who experience intense marital conflict tend to use 
aggressive behaviors as a means of problem solving, show hostile patterns of interaction, and may be forced to ally 
with one parent against the other.”) (internal citations omitted). 
138 Kashani & Allan, supra note 129, at 35.  
139 Elbedour et al., supra note 108, at 259.  
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
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child’s trust, security, and confidence.”143  In summation, since plural marriages carry a high risk 
of both conflict and instability, they pose a danger to children in them.  
 2. The Absence of a Father 
 Sarah Hammon’s father, a member of the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints (FLDS) 
church, had nineteen wives and seventy-five children; she, personally, was raised in a home with 
thirty siblings.  Of her relationship with her father she said: 
I didn’t have a relationship with my dad.  He didn’t know my name 
or who my mother was or even that I was his child unless I was in 
the house with him.  And that was for 13 years that I lived with him 
. . . .  I felt very lost in the family.  Like a number more than . . . a 
valuable member of it.144 
 
As this quote shows, the size of polygamous families can pose significant problems.  As the 
number of children and wives increases, interfamilial bonds become increasingly attenuated.145   
 The father-child bond is often strained by plural marriages.  Because polygamous 
marriages involve additional wives and children, a father’s time and attention is more thinly 
divided.  The resultant absence of a father figure negatively affects children.146  Summarizing the 
available research, Elbedour et al. concluded that “there are four key correlates of a father’s 
absence that have the strongest effect on children: (a) economic distress, which is associated with 
academic and psychosocial maladjustment; (b) the child’s perception of abandonment by the 
father; (c) social isolation; and (d) parental conflict.”147  These key correlates have the potential to 
evoke lasting psychological and physical harm.    
                                                        
143 See id. at 258 (“It is likely then that the sudden shift from a monogamous to a polygamous family system that 
occurs when a new spouse is added to the family would constitute just the kind of a major challenge to a developing 
child’s sense of trust, security, and confidence.”).  
144 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 667 (Can. B.C. S.C.).  
145 See Bala, supra note 109, at 198 (“Although children are surrounded by many sibling role models, and may 
receive care from more than one maternal figure, they receive less care and attention as more children are added to 
the family: both mother and father become less available, and the bonds between parent and child weaken.”).  
146 See Elbedour et al., supra note 108, at 259 (internal quotation omitted).  
147 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
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 3. Financial Stress 
 Polygamy is associated with high fertility rates, causing many polygamous families to have 
economic needs beyond their means.148  The relatively large size of polygamous families affects 
children by decreasing the amount of economic resources available to them.149  This strain has led 
“many polygamous families in the United States [to] receive social assistance.”150  Additionally, 
many wives in plural marriages do not work outside the home, and must therefore rely on their 
husband to be the main (or sole) financial provider.151  As a result, some women in polygamous 
marriages do not feel that they can leave the marriage, even if they are unhappy.152   
 A parent’s financial stress can harm the children of the marriage.  In particular, a mother’s 
financial stress can negatively affect the way in which she cares for her children.153  Numerous 
studies have shown that a family’s income has a direct effect on the psychological health of the 
children and is “negatively correlated with problems such as externalizing or internalizing 
behavior; depression, antisocial behavior, and poor impulse control; poor academic outcomes; and 
self-concept.”154  
 In conclusion, marital conflict, marital distress, the absence of a father, and financial stress 
affect a child’s mental and physical wellbeing.  This can start a “downward cycle of conflict,” 
                                                        
148 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 13 (Can. B.C. S.C.).  See 
also Symposium, Divorce Reform: Rights Protections in the New Swaziland, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 883, 898 n.89 
(2007) (“People in polygamous relationships tend to be very poor.  The most vulnerable children come from 
polygamous relationships.”) (quoting Interview with Phindile Weatherson, Bank Personnel, in Ezulwini, Swaz. 
(Mar. 7, 2006)).    
149 See Bala, supra note 109, at 198 (“[T]he more wives and children, the fewer resources available for each family 
member.”).  
150 Id.  
151 Elbedour et al., supra note 108, at 259.  
152 Joseph Bozzuti, Note, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a 
Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATHOLIC LAW. 409, 440 (2004) (“Women feel trapped due to, among other things, 
their many children and their financial dependence on the benevolence inherent in polygamous communities.”).    
153 See Elbedour, et al., supra note 108, at 259 (“[T]he mother’s distress has serious implication[s] for her children, 
because it can diminish her level of caring, supervision, and involvement.  Some distressed mothers can become 
withdrawn, depressed, and even hostile towards their children.”) (internal citation omitted).  
154 See id. at 260 (internal citations omitted).  
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since a child’s wellbeing may increase tension between his or her parents.155  A 2008 study of 
polygamous marriage amongst Bedouin Arabs in Israel exemplifies the problems associated with 
polygamous marriages and the way in which it negatively impacts children.  In this study, the 
authors found that children in polygamous marriages were more likely than children in 
monogamous marriages to suffer from psychiatric illnesses and issues, “including somatization, 
obsessive compulsion, depression, interpersonal sensitivity, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid 
ideation, and psychosis.” 156   Additionally, children in polygamous marriages reported 
experiencing issues relating to their peers, performing more poorly in school, and having worse 
relationships with their fathers.157 
 4. Effect on Adolescent Males 
  Polygamy also poses a threat to the wellbeing of adolescent males.  In many polygamous 
communities, and in Fundamentalist Mormon (FLDS) communities in particular, many adolescent 
and young men are effectively forced to leave the community to ensure that the “chosen” men 
have multiple wives.158  These young men are usually ill equipped to face life outside of the 
confines of polygamous life.  A main reason for this is that these young men usually have 
inadequate educations and insufficiently developed life skills and social support.159   
 Additionally, an increase in unmarried men poses a threat to society because unmarried 
men are “statistically predisposed to violence and other anti-social behavior.”160  If the United 
States Supreme Court were to legalize polygamy, a logical consequence would likely be an 
increase of unmarried males.  Since polygyny is the most common form of polygamy, legalization 
                                                        
155 Al-Krenawi & Graham, supra note 124, at 10.  
156 Al- Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo, supra note 7, at 759.  
157 Id.  
158 Bala, supra note 109, at 192.  
159 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 11 (Can. B.C. S.C.).   
160 Id. at para. 13.  
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of polygamy would likely lead more men to take more wives, decreasing the pool of potential 
brides.161  This could result in increased crime levels and a more prevalent exhibition of antisocial 
behavior by the large number of young, unmarried males.162   
 In his report, “Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Theory and Implications,” Dr. 
Joseph Heinrich found that unmarried men commit crimes more often, and the crimes they commit 
are often much more serious than the crimes committed by married men.163  Dr. Heinrich also 
found that marriage could decrease a man’s probability of criminal activity as much as thirty-five 
percent.164  Chief Justice Bauman of the Supreme Court of British Columbia found this study to 
be particularly compelling because of the breadth of the population studied; the study that Dr. 
Heinrich relied upon tracked the criminal activity of men ages seventeen to seventy.165  After 
conducting a cross-country comparison, Dr. Heinrich also found that polygamy is widely 
associated with higher levels of both murder and rape.166  Additionally, he found that higher crime 
rates were generally associated with greater numbers of unmarried males.167  This supports the 
belief that legalized polygamy, by increasing the number of unwed young males, could lead to 
higher crime rates.  
C. The State’s “Compelling Interest”  
 The harms inherent in plural marriages were highlighted in the landmark Canadian case, 
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 1588 (Can. B.C. S.C.).  
Canada’s parliament prohibits polygamy in Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada.  This 
                                                        
161 Id. at para. 499 (regarding the conclusions of Dr. Joseph Henrich’s study, “Polygyny in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective: Theory and Implications”).  
162 Id.  
163 Id. at para. 509.  
164 Id.  
165 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 509 (Can. B.C. S.C.).   
166 Id. at para. 511.   
167 Id.  
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case was brought by British Columbia to determine whether the prohibition of polygamy remained 
consistent with the Canadian Constitution, post-legalization of same-sex marriage.  In his majority 
opinion, Chief Justice Bauman concluded that “this case is essentially about harm . . . .  This 
includes harm to women, to children, to society and to the institution of monogamous marriage.”168  
He therefore held that the prohibition of polygamy does not constitute an unconstitutional 
prohibition.169  Because of the strength of the evidence attesting to the harm caused by polygamous 
marriages, it seems likely that the United States Supreme Court could find a similarly compelling 
interest.  
 Some supporters of polygamous marriages have analogized polygamous marriage to same-
sex marriage, arguing that both are “equally legitimate.”170  However, polygamous marriage is a 
distinct institution.171  Most prominently, the harm that polygamous marriage causes to women 
and children is well documented and differentiates a constitutional analysis of polygamous 
marriage from a similar analysis of same-sex marriage.  
 In Obergefell, the third of the Court’s four reasons for recognizing the right to marry 
someone of the same sex was that such recognition would protect children and families.172  In 
contrast, the State may have a compelling reason to prohibit polygamous marriage since there is 
substantial evidence that polygamous marriages cause substantial harm to women and children.  
Thus, Obergefell’s holding cannot be automatically applied to polygamous marriage.  For the 
                                                        
168 Id. at para. 5.  
169 Id. at para. 1361 (here, the law “is substantially constitutional and peripherally problematic”).   
170 Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1955, 1957 (2010).  
171 See id. (“[W]hile the gay analogy may make for splashy punditry and good television, it distracts us from what is 
truly distinctive, and legally meaningful, about polygamy—namely, its challenges to the regulatory assumptions 
inherent in the two-person marital model.”).  Also, many American laws are tailored to the two-personal marital 
model.  Examples include tax law, health law, estate law, divorce law, and family law.  Recognition of polygamous 
marriage as a legal marital institution would require substantial changes to such laws.   
172 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).  
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purposes of this Comment, it seems the most important exception to Obergefell’s holding (if it is 
not found to be limited to couples) is the institution of polygamous marriage itself.   
D. Is the Prohibition of Polygamous Marriage “Narrowly Tailored”? 
 It seems that the State has a compelling interest in prohibiting polygamous marriage.  Thus, 
the remaining question is the relationship of the “ends” (protection of women and children from 
the harms of polygamous marriage) to the “means” (the prohibition of polygamous marriage).  
Under strict scrutiny, the State needs to show that the prohibition of polygamous marriage is the 
only way to protect women and children from the associated harms.  Generally, domestic violence 
laws, child support laws, child custody laws, and child marriage laws protect women and children 
from some of the specific harms associated with polygamous marriage.  As a result, it might be 
difficult to show that prohibition of polygamous marriage is the only way to protect women and 
children from associated harms.  Thus, prohibition of polygamy may fail under the narrowly 
tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test.   
 Even if the United States Supreme Court were to conclude that anti-polygamy legislation 
is not narrowly tailored, it would not automatically toll the death-knell for anti-polygamy 
legislation.  Thus far, the Court has declined to articulate a specific standard of review for cases 
dealing with the fundamental right to marry.173  Instead of applying strict scrutiny, the Court may 
apply rational-basis review as it did in Turner v. Safley.  Under rational basis review, the protection 
of women and children need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.174  Because 
this is a much easier standard for the State to satisfy, prohibition of polygamous marriage is more 
likely to be upheld.  The State clearly has a legitimate interest (the protection of women and 
                                                        
173 See supra Part II.  
174 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is that legislation is 
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”).  
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children from the harms of polygamous marriage), and the prohibition of polygamous marriage is 
rationally related to accomplishing that goal.  Thus, a determination of the constitutionality of anti-
polygamy legislation could depend on the mode of judicial analysis.  
V. Conclusion 
  
 There is a fundamental right to marry that has been repeatedly recognized and reaffirmed 
by the United States Supreme Court.175  If the right to marry multiple people is seen as part of this 
fundamental right, restrictions on polygamous marriage would probably be subjected to 
heightened scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny, though not wholly insulating,176 is a hard standard for the 
State to satisfy.  Given the presence of alternative options, under strict scrutiny restrictions on 
polygamous marriage would probably be considered unconstitutional.  However, the Supreme 
Court has not yet held that strict scrutiny would be required, and thus it is equally likely that 
rational basis review or another deferential standard may apply.  It would be relatively easy for the 
Court to justify the prohibition of polygamous marriage under a less scrutinizing standard, given 
the strength of the State’s compelling interest in protecting women and children.  
 Despite the findings and conclusions made in this Comment, which weigh against the 
legalization of polygamous marriage, there are undoubtedly those who will argue in favor of 
polygamy’s constitutionality, on other grounds.177  This Comment has viewed the constitutionality 
                                                        
175 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
176 Strict scrutiny is not always fatal to the legislation at issue.  See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 
(1995) (“It is not true that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”).  
177 For example, some plural marriage advocates have argued that polygamy is a religious belief that is protected by 
the First Amendment.  However, American courts have repeatedly rejected this argument.  Resultantly, there is a 
wide body of precedent testifying to the fact that participants in polygamous marriage cannot use their religion as a 
shield.  See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) (stating that “the fact that polygamy is 
supported by a religious creed affords no defense in a prospection for bigamy”); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 746 
(Utah 2006) (holding that “Utah’s prohibition on polygamous behavior does not run afoul of constitutional 
guarantees protecting the free exercise of religion”); State v. Green, 98 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004) (reaffirming the 
Court’s holding in Reynolds and holding that “Utah’s bigamy statute does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution”); State v. Fischer, 199 P.3d 663, 667 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) 
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of polygamy through the lens of substantive due process.  Thus, other constitutional arguments are 
beyond the breadth of this Comment.    
 Post-Obergefell, the constitutionality of polygamous marriage is unclear.  Inclusion, or a 
lack thereof, of polygamous marriage in the fundamental right to marry will largely determine 
whether or not polygamous marriage is viewed as a fundamental right.  Additionally, even if 
polygamous marriage is held to be a fundamental right, we do not yet know which standard of 
review the Supreme Court would apply. 178   Despite the particular form of judicial review, 
polygamous marriage will still be haunted by the harm it can cause to women and children.  
Evidence of such harm may be a major hurdle to a judicially-recognized right to marry multiple 
people.  Perhaps even more importantly, though Obergefell widened access to the fundamental 
right to marry, entrance remains limited to two people at a time.    
                                                        
(“The United States Supreme Court has declined to extend the protection of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the practice of polygamy.”).  
178 The Court could choose to apply any standard of review in the spectrum, from rational basis review to strict 
scrutiny.  
